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Abstract— The detection of covert channels has quickly 
become a vital need due to their pervasive nature and the 
increasing popularity of the Internet. In recent years, new 
and innovative methods have been proposed to aid in the 
detection of covert channels. Existing detection schemes are 
often too specific and are ineffective against new covert 
channels. In this paper, we expound upon previous work 
done with timing channels and apply it to detecting covert 
storage channels. Our approach is based on the assumption 
that the entropy of covert channels will vary from that of 
previously observed, legitimate, communications. This 
change in the entropy of a process provides us with a 
method for identifying storage channels. Using this 
assumption we created proof of concept code capable of 
detecting various covert storage channels. The results of 
our experiments demonstrate that we can successfully detect 
existing and unpublished covert storage channels 
accurately. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Since Lampson [1] originally introduced the idea of covert 
channels on trusted systems, network based approaches have 
become more prevalent [2]. These network based approaches 
make it extremely challenging to secure traditional networks. 
Covert channels also prove problematic for individuals, 
companies, and countries in securing their information or 
data. In general there have been a number of different 
approaches, each with varying levels of success for detecting 
and dealing with network covert channels [2]. Most of these 
proposed schemes are designed to detect a specific covert 
channel and rely solely on signatures. 
 Recently, there has been research into using statistical 
methods in order to better detect covert channels, with mixed 
results [31]. Typically the major hindrance of these 
experiments is due to the large number of possibilities at 
different levels of network communications where a covert 
channel might occur. While there is recent research into a 
general detection scheme for network based timing channels 
[3], the same type of general solution has not been 
implemented for storage channels. 
  
 
In this paper we propose an entropy based detection 
mechanism for storage based network covert channels. 
Entropy, as defined by Shannon, is a measure of the 
uncertainty associated with a random variable [4]. While we 
observe that a network has many different types of data, we 
postulate that much of it remains constant with the exception 
of application payloads and checksum fields. From this we 
concluded that the creation of a storage channel should 
behave as a statistical outlier when compared to the normal 
operation of a network. 
 In order to detect this we use a large baseline estimate of 
the network traffic and analyze new entries into the network 
based on the calculated entropy levels that have been seen. 
The effect of a given packet will then modify the previous 
entropy estimation allowing, in time, the system to learn what 
is acceptable for the network and adapt to new technologies, 
as well as the detection of storage channels.  
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
 Covert channels have historically been broken up into two 
separate categories: storage channels and timing channels [7]. 
More recently a non-ambiguous definition has been devised 
that defines a storage covert channel as a communication 
channel in which “the output alphabet consists of different 
responses all taking the same time to be transmitted” and a 
timing covert channel as a channel where “the output 
alphabet is made up of different time values corresponding to 
the same response” [10, 12]. Additionally, the idea of 
behavioral based covert channels has been introduced in [11]. 
 These categories are further broken down by the system they 
use (network or single system), their stealthiness, and 
bandwidth. The main characteristic of a covert channel is the 
aim to hide the fact that a transmission is taking place [5]. 
Early research has shown it is almost impossible to 
completely eliminate covert channels. Accordingly, the US 
government has stated that a covert channel with a bandwidth 
under 1 bit per second is acceptable [7]. Thus the main goal 
of research in this field is to develop defenses against covert 
channels such as removing them, disrupting them, managing 
their threat and alerting to their presence. Since there is 
always such a large amount of data, the techniques of 
alerting, managing and disrupting are more realistic and 
prevalent in research [2]. 
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  There has been extensive research devoted to detecting 
timing channels. Research started with [6] and the 
identification of covert channel capacity for auditability. 
Additional auditability techniques were introduced in [15] 
which allowed for audited applications that depended on 
relative timing of operations. The first techniques to prevent 
timing channels were presented in [9, 14] in the forms of 
pumping and artificial noise injection, these techniques 
introduce artificial timing delays to communications in order 
to eliminate timing channels. In [8] the idea of pumping is 
evolved into that of jammers which can modulate noise and 
timing in order to reduce the overall capacity of a given 
channel.   Recent research has established a basis for 
statistically determining a timing channel from amongst 
legitimate data and alerting on it [3, 5]. Throughout this 
whole time frame, individuals who developed covert 
channels also presented signature based defenses for 
detecting their own specific covert channels [10, 22, 25]. 
 While many effective techniques have been developed to 
defend against timing based channels less published work is 
available to detect covert storage channels. We see early 
work done on calculating bandwidth and capacity of the 
channels by [17]. Additionally, [11, 16] discuss the 
possibility of detecting storage channels at the development 
stage of production. Recently, [17, 19] used network 
normalization to remove avenues that could potentially carry 
a covert channel. As with timing channels, individuals 
authors also presented signature based methods to detect their 
own storage channel [20, 21, 23, 24]. In our paper we 
expound upon previous detection techniques available for 
timing channels [3], applying them to storage channels to 
provide a viable solution to detect network based storage 
channels. 
3. ENTROPY CALCULATION 
3.1 Entropy 
 Our hypothesis for detection of storage based covert 
channels focuses on the mathematical formula known as 
information entropy.  As previously stated, entropy is a 
measure of the uncertainty associated with a random variable. 
 Putting this simply, entropy tells us how much randomness 
exists in a set of values for a given variable.  In this case, the 
random variable is a field in a network protocol header.  By 
this logic, we are able to gather the values for fields and, after 
collecting a minimum amount, calculate the randomness of 
the field value.  At some point this randomness value should 
reach a plateau, if the field itself isn’t based on a random 
function.  At this point we assume that this is the normal 
entropy for that field on the network, and that a significant 
change in entropy would be a sign of the existence of a covert 
storage channel.  As a quick example, the RFC for ICMP 
denotes that the code field for an ICMP Echo Request should 
always be zero.  If we assume that all devices on the network 
are obeying the RFC we should be able to say with certainly 
that the randomness of this field, over time, should equal 
zero.  The presence of a covert storage channel utilizing the 
code field would thus create a spike in entropy, triggering an 
alert. 
4. TEST CHANNELS 
 We selected a number of covert storage channels in order 
to test how effective our algorithm was at detecting variations 
on a network. We developed or implemented the following 
covert channels which had varying levels of bandwidth and 
stealthiness along with network impact.  Each test channel 
was chosen because it uses a different network protocol, 
giving us a wider array of covert channels to test.  
 
4.1 ICMPv4 & ICMPv6 Based Covert 
Channels 
 In order to first identify a basic covert channel we 
developed a very simple technique to send data via the ICMP 
code field. According to the RFC this field should always be 
zero [29]. This technique was based loosely on the ideas 
presented in [26] and enabled us to have a moderately 
stealthy channel from which to develop our test methods 
around. This concept was then expanded, to include both the 
identification and sequence numbers in the ICMP Echo 
header. 
To add another protocol to our tests, we created a ICMPv6 
covert channel based loosely on [27, 20]. This allowed us to 
expand our abilities to detect different protocols beyond those 
based on IPv4.  This covert channel uses techniques similar 
to that of the ICMPv4 variant discussed earlier.. 
 
4.2 UDP Based Covert Channel 
 After demonstrating success with an ICMP covert channel, 
we examined a storage based covert channel presented in 
[28]. This covert channel modulates the length fields found in 
network and transport layer protocols to send packets with 
even or odd lengths, which in turn translate to a one or zero. 
 This gives the potential to transmit a bit of data per packet. 
 Using standardized protocols such as UDP and IP this model 
proposes a minimum bandwidth ratio of 1:11680, but can 
easily be increased depending on the maximum transmission 
unit for a network. 
 
4.3 TCP Based  Covert Channel 
 Our last test channel was a very simple covert channel 
found in the TCP protocol. This channel is one of the classic 
examples of a storage based covert channel and is presented 
in [14].  This covert channel uses an unused field in the TCP 
header to send up to 4 bits of data per packet.  It should be 
noted that this is a dated and deprecated covert channel. 
5. EXPERIMENTATION 
 To reinforce our hypothesis that storage channels can be 
detected using entropy, we developed a proof of concept 
(PoC) program capable of capturing, dissecting and 
 calculating entropy associated with network traffic.  This 
program uses the network protocol dissectors built into 
Scapy, a packet manipulation module for Python.  After 
creating our proof of concept code and the test channels 
described above, we conducted a few experiments to test the 
overall effectiveness of the code. Our experiment consisted 
of using random packet captures from an active private 
network; each packet capture was 50,000 packets in size and 
was captured at different points during the day. In each 
packet capture one of the covert channels that we 
implemented was executed. We parsed these packets into our 
software and evaluated our success based on the outcome. 
 
5.1 Proof of Concept Design 
 The overall flow of the PoC is summarized in the figure 
below [Figure 1].  The program has two phases: a learning 
phase, and a analysis phase.  Even though the program is 
designed to be a proof of concept, it is still designed to be 
robust and expandable.  This would allow us to move from 
just a proof of concept to a usable, implementable piece of 
code. 
Figure1PoCFlow
 
5.1.1 Learning Phase 
 In the learning phase, the program establishes a network 
entropy profile by capturing and storing network traffic.  The 
PoC allows a customizable window size of traffic to be 
specified. This is designed to provide flexibility for various 
network implementations. The window size is a requirement 
of the program that specifies how much traffic will be taken 
in before the actual entropy comparisons are calculated. This 
is done to establish a base entropy calculation for the 
network. By definition the larger the window size the more 
accurate comparisons will be, leading to less false positives. 
The window size also serves as the buffer for incoming 
packets during the analysis phase, therefore, a larger window 
size, although allowing for more comparisons, also requires 
exponentially more computation. Another feature we have 
added during this phase is the ability to manually specify 
which protocols should be analyzed, thereby decreasing the 
amount of computation required.  Once the specified 
threshold of network traffic has been reached, the program 
transitions to the analysis phase.  
5.1.2 Analysis Phase 
 The analysis phase is responsible for monitoring and 
alerting deviations in entropy based on the profile established 
in the learning phase, as well as to continuously learn and 
maintain the entropy profile.  This process creates a network 
dependent behavioral based approach to detecting storage 
based covert channels.  We provided a configurable 
sensitivity level which allows the code to be customizable to 
a given network.  The various setting of the sensitivity 
parameter control, to some degree, the amount of false 
positives produced by the code.  The sensitivity parameter 
works hand in hand with the window size parameter specified 
in the previous section to create a scalable sensitivity that 
allows the window size to range from a value as small as 64 
packets to as large as 500,000 packets and remain accurate. 
5.2 Experimental Setup 
 We had a total of four experiments that we conducted in 
which we attempted to detect our test covert channels. 
Although each tests was performed independently the same 
application and principles were used for each. For all four of 
our experiments we used the same default settings. For our 
experiments we choose the relatively low training window 
size of 256, that is, the program took its base assessment of 
the network from the first 256 packets and started evaluating 
entropy after that point.  While with a higher window size we 
would see initially lower false positive results the total 
detection rate should arrive at the same level of effectiveness 
do to its ability to learn the network. The reason why we 
selected a low window size is so that we didn’t discard vital 
packet information where our covert channels might be 
occurring in the experiment data. In real world usage training 
could be done on many thousands of packets prior to full 
scale usage. The experiments were all designed to transmit 
the same message for each channel to maintain consistency 
for detection purposes. We choose the words “this is a test 
hello world”.  Additionally, for each experiment we used 3 
different levels of  sensitivity, what these levels indicate is 
the amount of variation in entropy on a given field that was 
allowed without reporting the event as suspicious. The three 
levels: low, medium and high had 10.04%, 8.007%, and 
3.45% variation allowed respectively. 
5.3 Experimental Results 
 Our experiments indicated that our original notion that 
covert channels will behave as statistical entropy outliers was 
correct. With high sensitivity we achieved, on average, a 
94.75% detection rate with a false positive rate less than 1%. 
While that is an accomplishment, having several hundred 
false positives could present an issue without proper 
screening. Low sensitivity achieved nearly as impressive 
detection rates with an average of 75.25% of covert packets 
 detected with a far lower false positive rate of 124.75 or 
0.25%. Ultimately, we believe that the experimental results 
show that given proper training and configuration our method 
would result in lower false positive rates while maintaining 
the expected high detection rates. It is also important to note 
that false positives that were detected are activity that is not 
normally seen on the network. That being the case, although 
it is not a covert channel, the packet has a high probability of 
being other unwanted traffic. Additionally, although we can 
see detection rates drop off at low sensitivity in a monitored 
environment, only one detection of a covert channel should 
be enough to alert the maintainer of the network to its 
presence and allow for it to be disabled accordingly. 
 
Figure 2 – Detection Rates 
 
 
5.3.1 ICMP Code Field Results 
 When testing for the ICMP Code channel we originally 
used high sensitivity, although this approach generated many 
more false positives, 408 precisely, it alerted us to 97% of the 
packets that contained the covert channel. When we moved to 
medium sensitivity where an 8.007% change in entropy per 
second would alert us, we received similarly high results, 
achieving an 84% detection rate with 263 false positives. 
Moving to low sensitivity we only achieved a 68% detection 
rate but we also only had 126 false detections over our entire 
capture of 50,000 packets. 
5.3.2 TCP Unused Field Channel Results 
 The TCP unused field channel can only transmit 4 bits per 
packet, as a result very many packet have to be sent in order 
to get a full message across. This turned out to be a double 
edged sword in terms of detection for our algorithm. In the 
short term such a large amount of random traffic was 
immediately detected on all sensitivity settings. However, we 
found that if the message was very large the extreme amount 
of traffic would eventually become expected by the algorithm 
causing detection rate to drop. Using our test message this 
channel generated 26 packets, on both high and medium  we 
had a 100% detection rate for this particular channel. When 
on low sensitivity we dropped to 94%. While the detection 
rate was high we continued to maintain a comparative steady 
level of false positives getting 367 false positives on high 
sensitivity, 197 false positives on medium sensitivity, and 
103 false positives on low sensitivity. 
5.3.3 ICMPv6 Code Channel Results 
 Being very similar to the original ICMP channel we 
expected similar results in terms of detection rates and false 
positives. We were indeed not disappointed, the variation that 
we had is most likely a result of the different traffic between 
the two captures. Our results had 392, 278, and 114 false 
positives on high, medium, and low sensitivity levels 
respectively. We achieved slightly better detection rates 
compared to the regular ICMP channel as well - detecting 
72% on low sensitivity, 87% on medium sensitivity, and 95% 
on high sensitivity. A reason for these slightly better rates 
could be due to the fact that although the network captures 
contain IPv6 traffic it is relatively low due to the amount of 
IPv4 packet. This discrepancy, although true in real life, also 
makes it harder for our covert channel to blend in thereby 
making it easier to detect. 
5.3.4 UDP Length Channel Results 
 Our final channel dealt with UDP length and had very 
interesting properties where it didn’t try to modify an actual 
field but rather modified the packet itself in order to add 
length. While we expected to be able to detect this channel 
we expected the results to be lower detection rates then the 
other channels. We had very similar false positives to the 
other channels having 433, 329, 156 false positives with 
regards to high, medium and low sensitivity respectively. The 
detection rates, while existent, were lower here being 87, 72, 
and 67 percent 
 
 
Figure 3 – False Positives Rates 
 
 
6. LIMITATIONS 
 In this section we discuss possible limitations of our 
entropy based system to detect covert channels. A large 
requirement imposed by this system is the need for intense 
packet analysis. This scanning can be done on existing packet 
captures but is most effective on a live network. This type of 
 packet analysis is most analogous to deep packet inspection 
and requires an in-line component that will slow down the 
network.  
 Additionally, at this time, our approach is only possible on 
protocols for which the specification is known and using 
unencrypted transmissions. The reason for this is due to the 
entropy calculation on a per field basis. As a result of the 
requirements there are several countermeasures to this type of 
detection, the most obvious being encryption. Other 
countermeasures include: using unknown protocols and using 
non-network based covert channels. As with most entropy 
based systems adjusting the system correctly to minimize 
false positives, while still reporting legitimate covert channels 
is pivotal. 
 As a final limitation, our tool is still not one-hundred 
percent error free.  Because of its fully adaptive capabilities, 
our proof of concept is prone to false-positive results, 
especially in high entropy fields.  This means that the tool, 
while effective, might require additional human examination 
of network traffic. 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
We expounded on previous work for using entropy to 
detect timing channels and applied it successfully to the 
detection of storage based covert channels. We designed and 
created a system which is implemented for some of the more 
prevalent packet types and allows easy expansion in the 
future for other types. We utilized a standard entropy 
calculation in order to identify a number of different covert 
storage channels.  
In the future we would like to explore the connections 
between other suspicious activity and the use of covert 
channels.  Additionally, we would like to see if the current 
detection system could be adapted to not only detect covert 
channels, but also to block and filter them. This type of 
system could take advantage of normalization on only 
suspect packets thereby making the previous work on 
normalization more effective, turning our passive warden 
system into an active warden system. Furthermore, we want 
to investigate ways to further reduce the false positive rate 
while keeping the detection rate stable. 
REFERENCES 
[1] B. Lampson. “A Note on the Confinement Problem.” Commun. ACM, 
vol. 16, no. 10, Oct. 1973, pp. 613–615. 
[2] S. Zander. “A Survey Of Covert Channels and Countermeasures In 
Computer Network Protocols.” IEEE Communications Surveys, vol.9, no. 3, 
 3rd Quarter 2007. 
[3] S. Gianvecchio and H. Wang. “Detecting Covert Timing Channels: An 
Entropy-Based Approach.” Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on 
Computer and communications security (CCS '07). ACM, New York, NY, 
USA, pp. 307-316. 
[4] C. Shannon. “A mathematical theory of communication.” Bell System 
Technical Journal Vol. 27, July and Oct. 1948). 
[5] V. Berk et al. “Detection of Covert Channel Encoding in Network Packet 
Delays.” Technical Report TR536, Revision 1, revised November 2005. 
[6] J. K. Millen. “Finite-state Noiseless Covert Channels.” Proc. Computer 
Security Foundations Workshop 11, Franconia, NH, June 1989, pp. 81-86. 
[7] U.S. Department of Defense. Trusted computer system evaluation "The 
Orange Book". DoD 5200.28-STD Washington: GPO:1985, 1985 
[8] J. Giles and B. Hajek. “An information-theoretic and game-theoretic 
study of timing channels.” IEEE Transaction on Information Theory, volume 
48, pages 2455-2477, September 2003. 
[9] M. Kang, I. Moskowitz, and D. Lee. A network version of the pump. In 
Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium in Security and Privacy, pages 144-154, 
May 1995. 
[10] CR. Tsai. "A Formal Method for the Identification of Covert Storage 
Channels in Source Code." Proceedings of the 1987 IEEE Symposium on 
Security and Privacy, pp. 74-87. 
[11] D. Johnson et al. “Behavior-Based Covert Channel in Cyberspace.” 
Intelligent Decision Making Systems, pp. 311-318. 
[12] I. S. Moskowitz and M. H. Kang. “Covert channels - Here to stay?” 
Proceedings of the 9th Annual Conference on Computer Assurance 
(COMPASS’94). National Institute of Standards and Technology, pp. 235–
244. 
[13] H. Wei-Ming, “Reducing Timing Channels with Fuzzy Time,” Proc. 
IEEE Computer Society Symp. Research in Security and Privacy, May 1991, 
pp. 8–20. 
[14] T. Handel and M. Sandford. “Hiding data in the OSI network model.” 
First International Workshop on Information Hiding(Cambridge, U.K.), May-
June 1996. 
[15] P. M. Melliar-Smith and L. E. Moser. “Protection against covert storage 
and timing channels.” Proc. Computer Security Foundations Workshop IV, 
June 1991, pp. 209–214. 
[16] L. E. Moser, “Data dependency graphs for Ada programs,” IEEE 
Transactions on Software Engineering, vol. 16, no. 5, pp. 498-509. 
[17] CR. Tsai and V. D. Gligor. “A Bandwidth Computation Model for 
Covert Storage Channels and its Applications.” Proc. IEEE Conf. on Security 
and Privacy, 1988. 
[18] M. Handley and V. Paxson. “Network Intrusion Detection: Evasion, 
Traffic Normalization, and End-to-End Protocol Semantics.” Proceedings of 
the 10th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 10, 2001. 
[19] G. R. Malan et al. “Transport and Application Protocol Scrubbing.” 
Proc. IEEE Conf. Computer Communications (INFOCOM), Mar. 2000, pp. 
1381–1390. 
[20] N. B. Lucena et al. “Covert Channels in IPv6.” Proc. Privacy Enhancing 
Technologies (PET), May 2005, pp. 147–166. 
[21] A. Singh et al. “Malicious ICMP Tunneling: Defense against the 
Vulnerability.” Proc. 8th Australasian Conf. Information Security and 
Privacy (ACISP), July 2003, pp. 226–235. 
[22] N. Schear et al. “Glavlit: Preventing Exfiltration at Wire Speed.” Proc. 
5th Wksp. Hot Topics in Networks (HotNets), Nov. 2006. 
[23] C. H. Rowland. “Covert Channels in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite.” First 
Monday, Peer Reviewed Journal on the Internet, July 1997. 
[24] daemon9. “LOKI2: The Implementation.” Phrack Magazine, vol. 7, no. 
51, Sept. 1997. 
[25] S. Cabuk et al. “IP Covert Timing Channels: Design and Detection.” 
Proc. 11th ACM Conf. Computer and Communications Security (CCS), Oct. 
25–29 2004, pp. 178–187. 
[26] T. Sohn et al. “Covert Channel Detection in the ICMP Payload Using 
Support Vector Machine.” Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volume 
2776, 2003, pp. 461-464. 
[27] R. P. Murphy. “V00d00n3t – Ipv6 / ICMPv6 Covert Channel.” Slides 
from DEFCON, 2006. 
[28] B. Yuan et al. “A Covert Channel in Packet Switching Data Network.” 
The Second Upstate New York Workshop on Communications and 
Networking, Rochester, NY, November 2005. 
[29] J. Postel. “Internet Control Message Protocol.” Network Working 
Group, RFC 792, Sept. 1981, pp. 14. 
[30] E. Tumoian and M. Anikeev. "Detecting NUSHU Covert Channels 
Using Neural Networks." Technical report, Taganrog State University of 
Radio Engineering, 2005. 
 
 
 
 
